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Abstract
We present results from laboratory experiments studying the impacts of
affirmative-action policies. We induce statistical discrimination in simple
labor-market interactions between firms and workers. We then introduce
affirmative-action policies that vary in the size and duration of a subsidy firms
receive for hiring discriminated-against workers. These different affirmative-
action policies have nearly the same effect and practically eliminate discrim-
inatory hiring practices. However, once lifted, few positive effects remain
and discrimination reverts to its initial levels. One exception is lengthy
affirmative-action policies, which exhibit somewhat longer-lived effects. Stick-
iness of beliefs, which we elicit, helps explain the evolution of these outcomes.
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of NSF grants SES-1558757 and CNS-1518941. Yariv gratefully acknowledges the support of NSF grant
SES-1629613.
1 Introduction
Affirmative-action policies have had a tumultuous history since their introduction over 50
years ago in the U.S.1 Intended to alleviate inequality in employment and pay, increase
access to education, and promote diversity, they have been a subject of legal and political
controversy. In their various forms, they are often set as a temporary “nudge”, put in
place for a limited duration. For instance, in 2003, the Supreme Court ruled the use of
race for affirmative action in school admissions as constitutional (Grutter v. Bollinger).
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor famously stated that:
“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer
be necessary to further the interest [in student-body diversity] approved to-
day.”
In this paper, we focus on statistical discrimination, where the source of unequal treat-
ment is a correct statistical evaluation of past performance of different groups of indi-
viduals, rather than differential tastes. Our goal is to assess experimentally the efficacy
of several affirmative-action policies for generating equal treatment while in place and,
especially, after they are lifted.
Our results are threefold. The first is methodological: we are able to induce sta-
tistical discrimination in the laboratory, where workers from a disadvantaged group are
discriminated against despite the absence of any exogenous differences between them.
We consider affirmative-action policies that seek to reverse the induced discriminatory
attitudes by rewarding firms for hiring disadvantaged workers. Rewards are of varying
amounts and duration. Our second finding is that such policies, while in place, generally
succeed in eliminating discrimination and all workers are hired at similar rates. However,
1The term “affirmative action” was introduced by President John F. Kennedy in an executive order
in 1961 as a method for redressing discrimination that had persisted in spite of civil rights laws and
constitutional guarantees. It was further developed and enforced under President Lyndon B. Johnson.
1
our third and arguably most important finding is that when affirmative-action policies
are removed, statistical discrimination rears its head. Furthermore, our elicitation of
beliefs illustrates that differing group-specific beliefs, which lie at the root of the dis-
crimination we observe, survive the different affirmative-action policies we implement.
The main message of the paper therefore suggests more limited optimism than Justice
O’Connor’s statement—while affirmative action policies are effective tools for combating
inequality while in place, their impact is short-lived. Once lifted, behavior reverts back
to the unequal treatment that affirmative action was designed to undo.
Our experimental design is a particularly simple operationalization of the statistical
discrimination model suggested by Kenneth Arrow (1971; 1973). In Arrow’s model,
statistical discrimination is the manifestation of a coordination failure.2 Simplified, the
game underlying Arrow’s analysis can be described as follows. Agents interact in worker-
firm pairs in every period. A worker may invest in a firm-specific skill, but this investment
is worthwhile only if she is hired. The firm’s incentives are such that hiring a worker
is desirable only if the worker has invested in acquiring the skill. However, workers and
firms do not know each other’s choices when making their own. The resulting game has
two Pareto-ranked pure equilibria. In one, the worker invests and the firm hires. In the
other, the worker does not invest and the firm does not hire.
In our experiments, workers are of two types: green and purple. Colors are a metaphor
for group identity and substitute for observable characteristics of real-world workers (e.g.,
gender, race). Colors can serve as a coordination device, with different equilibria being
followed when different types of workers are involved. Importantly, worker color is observ-
able, both in our experiments and their real-world analogues. We term outcomes in which
agents play different equilibria, depending on the color of the worker, as discriminatory.
2Arrow’s model assumes a perfectly symmetric situation and generates differences among groups
endogenously. Phelps (1972a) also proposes statistical discrimination as an explanation for observed
discriminatory outcomes, but his explanation requires the existence of genuine exogenous differences
between groups.
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In each of our sessions, experimental workers and firms are randomly matched, and
play the game multiple times. All participants observe a moving average of historical
play—worker investment levels and firm hiring rates pertaining to both green and purple
workers. The public history of play is used to generate hysteresis.
Our sessions are comprised of four stages. First, our participants play a version of the
game in which purple workers are less productive than green workers—i.e., have higher
costs of investment. This first stage of the game “seeds” the discriminatory outcome.
In the second stage, we equalize the costs of investment across workers so that there
are no material differences between the two worker groups. The history of play is enough
to generate discriminatory outcomes: we find that participants coordinate on the ineffi-
cient equilibrium (no-investment and no-hiring) when the participating worker is purple.
Indeed, in almost all sessions, firms hire purple workers at significantly lower rates than
green workers, as they correctly anticipate purple workers will invest at lower rates. Con-
versely, purple workers invest less than green workers as they correctly anticipate that
they will not be hired as often. These observations illustrate two points. First, our
method of inducing discrimination is effective. Second, when we equalize conditions, dis-
crimination remains. In particular, equalization in and of itself is insufficient to redress
discrimination due to a historically unequal environment.
The third stage introduces affirmative action. Namely, firms are rewarded for hiring
purple workers. We vary the magnitude of the reward and the duration of affirmative
action across treatments. Despite a salient public history of inefficient outcomes associ-
ated with purple workers, we now see firms more willing to hire purple workers. In turn,
purple workers invest at greater rates. Across our treatments, while affirmative action is
in place, discrimination essentially goes away.
Finally, in the last stage, we lift the affirmative-action policy. Thus, the last stage
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(a) Workers’ investment decisions (b) Firms’ hiring decisions
Figure 1
is identical to the second stage, in which the environment is perfectly symmetric across
worker types. Across our treatments, participants’ play reverts back to the discriminatory
equilibrium we observed in the second stage of our experiment: purple workers invest
less often than green workers, and are hired less often. In other words, the effects of
affirmative action are short-lived. One exception is the treatment in which affirmative
action was imposed for a relatively long duration, for double the number of periods of
each of the other stages. In that case, some improvement is seen even after the policy
is lifted, but outcomes are still significantly different from those implied by an equal
treatment of workers.
Figure 1 illustrates our main findings through our benchmark treatment, entailing a
moderate affirmative-action subsidy for a duration that equals the duration of our other
experimental stages. It shows investment and hiring rates for the different stages of
our experiment, using green and purple colors to distinguish matches. The figure illus-
trates the findings described above: the baseline stage exhibits statistical discrimination;
affirmative action largely equalizes hiring and investment rates between green and pur-
ple workers; and the removal of affirmative action sees participants reverting back to
statistical discrimination.
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In our experimental design, the aggregate public history of play is used to generate
hysteresis, in an attempt to capture discriminatory path-dependent outcomes in the real
world. We find that the strength of discrimination survives affirmative action. In one of
our treatments, the subsidy for hiring a purple worker is so high that it is a dominant
strategy for firms to hire, and therefore a best response for purple workers to invest.
This treatment exactly reverses the situation in the seed stage, where it is dominant for
purple workers not to invest. Even in this treatment, where we mirror the incentives
provided in the seed stage, affirmative action does not have lasting effects. We view this
result as particularly telling. Naturally, it is difficult to determine which experimental
implementation of affirmative action comes closest to capturing the mechanism operating
behind real-world policies. But a policy that is the exact mirror image of the “seed”
conditions that induced discrimination to begin with seems like a natural candidate for
undoing discrimination. We find, however, that discrimination persists.
Why are the effects of affirmative action so short-lived? The impacts on beliefs provide
some insights. Throughout our experiments, we elicit the beliefs of workers regarding
their probabilities of being hired, as well as the beliefs of firms regarding the probabilities
of the workers they encounter investing in training. In our experiments, firms’ decisions
to hire purple workers are consistent with their reported beliefs about whether workers
have invested. Affirmative-action policies change (temporarily) the decision to hire a
purple workers, but firms’ beliefs do not change significantly—beliefs are sticky. These
beliefs do not change substantially when affirmative-action policies are introduced or
removed. Their level is such that hiring is optimal when subsidies are present, but
not when they vanish. As firms appear to be best responding to their beliefs and the
incentives they face, this stickiness in firms’ expectations accounts for the quickly-fading
impacts of affirmative action.
To summarize, with a growing desire to equalize the playing field across the market,
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our results suggest that affirmative-action policies should be thought through carefully.
In their frequent forms, to be effective, they need to be both substantial in magnitude
and long-lived.
2 Related Literature
Arrow (1998) argues that taste-based discrimination cannot explain unequal treatment of
workers in the market since there would be arbitrage opportunities that would eventually
drive out discriminating economic actors. Arrow concludes that statistical discrimination
is the main existing hypothesis for explaining the prevalence of discrimination in market
settings.
Statistical discrimination is consistent with a rich set of observations in the field.
For instance, Ewens, Tomlin, and Wang (2014) identify statistical discrimination in the
US rental market over race by analyzing renters’ responses to applications from white-
sounding and African American-sounding names in various neighborhoods. Glover, Pal-
lais, and Pariente (2017) consider interactions between managers and workers in grocery
stores and find that more biased managers are associated with lower performance of
minority workers, a pattern similar to that we induce in our seed stage.3
Coate and Loury (1993) provide a theoretical investigation of statistical discrimination
and affirmative action. They raise the possibility that discrimination may persist after a
period of affirmative action. Some of the basic ideas in their theoretical model are present
in our design: interactions are essentially bilateral, between workers and firms. Workers
can invest, but an informative signal of their decision is available to the firms. Workers’
incentives to invest are, in fact, channeled through the informative signal (workers want
3Bohren, Imas, and Rosenberg (2017) run a field experiment using a large online platform where
users post content that is evaluated by others on the platform. They consider the assessment of posts
exogenously varied by gender and history on the platform and find evidence for biased beliefs driving
discriminatory attitudes. Our seeding stage serves to induce such biased beliefs.
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to invest as it directly affects the chances they will be hired). In our design, in contrast,
there is more of a pure coordination failure. Workers want to invest even if they are
guaranteed to be hired: indeed, that is the case that maximizes workers’ incentives to
invest.
There are several studies that bring the Coate and Loury (1993) model to the lab.
Anderson and Haupert (1999) and Fryer, Goeree, and Holt (2005) designed classroom
experiments that capture the main forces of Coate and Loury (1993). The design of our
seeding stage is inspired by these, with two important differences. First, we do not allow
(explicit) random signals on workers’ investment decisions. Second, workers’ incentives
to invest respond to whether they are hired or not—we focus on a pure coordination
setup.
Kidd, Carlin, and Pot (2008) seek to replicate some of the details in the Coate and
Loury model. In particular, their design relies on an informative signal of whether a
worker has invested, and much of the analysis tests the comparative-statics results of
Coate and Loury (1993). In this setting, workers over-invest. However, the incentive
structure in their design is not one of pure coordination failure like ours, in the sense
that a worker’s incentive to invest is not higher when they know that they will be hired.
Furthermore, the Kidd, Carlin, and Pot (2008) design is one-sided: experimental par-
ticipants play the role of workers, while firms’ choices are computerized. In our study,
firms’ choices are an important object for analysis, and their evolving beliefs, which we
elicit, provide hints as to the source of the limited long-run efficacy of affirmative ac-
tion we observe. Feltovich, Gangadharan, and Kidd (2013) use a similar design to that
used by Kidd, Carlin, and Pot (2008), but focus on outcomes following the removal of
an affirmative-action policy. They find that workers invest significantly more after the
affirmative action has been removed than when it is in place. In their design, since the
incentives to invest operate through their effects on the informative signal, workers who
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know they will be hired do not have strong incentives to invest. Therefore, affirmative
action suppresses investment. Our experiment has the opposite property, and we see that
workers invest more when the affirmative-action policy is in place.4
Outside of the Coate and Loury (1993) setting, various studies have looked at affirmative-
action policies in the lab. For example, in the context of gender discrimination, Niederle,
Segal, and Vesterlund (2013) illustrate the effectiveness of affirmative-action policies in
inducing women to compete. In contrast, Bracha, Cohen, and Conell-Price (2005) illus-
trate the potential harmful effects of affirmative action through its production of stereo-
type threat, whereby women are primed with negative stereotypes. Anderson, Fryer, and
Holt (2006) present a survey of experiments in psychology and economics dealing with
discrimination.
There is important work using field data that suggests potential shortcomings of af-
firmative action. Sander (2004) illustrates several negative impacts on African-American
law students in the US. Sander and Taylor (2012) provide a comprehensive account of
the impacts of affirmative-action policies on racial equality in US higher education. They
suggest that even while in place, affirmative-action policies may have had detrimental
effects on minority students.5
To conclude, we believe there are several features of our design whose combination
is absent from most of the literature on affirmative action. First, we generate discrimi-
nation in the lab, rather than relying on participants’ existing prejudices that may vary
in strength and be difficult to control. Second, we allow both workers and firms to act
strategically and elicit all participants’ beliefs throughout the evolution of our experi-
4Haan, Offerman, and Sloof (2015) study experimentally the impacts of of competition on statistical
discrimination. They show that, in the setting of Coate and Loury (1993), competition allows statistical
discrimination to emerge more easily and forcefully.
5Krueger, Rothstein, and Turner (2006) assess empirically Justice O’Connor’s prediction that affir-
mative action would not be needed 25 years after the Grutter v. Bollinger ruling and find limited support
for it.
8
mental sessions. Beliefs are challenging to elicit in the field and provide insights into the
mechanisms driving the successes and limitations of affirmative action. Last, we consider
the impacts of affirmative action not only when it is in place, but also after it is lifted.
Methodologically, our technique for seeding discrimination relies on the presence of
hysteresis—equilibrium selection at the start of the experiment affects selection later on.
Outside the context of discrimination, Romero (2015) illustrates the presence of hysteresis
in standard coordination games in which payoff parameters were changed over time.
3 Experimental Design
We start with an overview of the basic statistical-discrimination model guiding our design
and its motivations. We then set forth a detailed description of our experimental protocol.
3.1 Statistical Discrimination
There are two leading theories of discrimination: taste-based (Becker, 1957) and statis-
tical (Phelps, 1972b; Arrow, 1973). Taste-based discrimination attributes discriminatory
decisions to an inherent preference for agents of certain groups over others. Statistical
discrimination refers to the idea that, in the absence of direct information about a certain
aspect of ability, a decision-maker would substitute group averages or variances corre-
sponding to the individual’s demographics (e.g., gender, race). It is challenging to rule
out empirically that discrimination is taste-based, but in the lab one can ensure that
there is no inherent preference for one group over another.6
6There are notable econometric efforts to identify a statistical discrimination parameter in a structural
model (Knowles, Persico, and Todd, 2001) or in other ways (Glover, Pallais, and Pariente, 2017)). There
are also studies that aim to control the source of discrimination in a field experiment, e.g., Agan and Starr
(2016) and Ewens, Tomlin, and Wang (2014). However, broadly speaking, it is difficult to completely
rule out taste-based discrimination with field data. The lab has the advantage that one can control
agents’ payoffs and observe the evolution of their beliefs.
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Firm
Hire Not Hire
Worker
Invest 1800− c, 1600 1000− c, 1200
Not Invest 1400, 400 1200, 1200
Table 1: The investment/hiring game, where c denotes the cost of investment.
Following Arrow (1971), we focus on statistical discrimination in the labor market,
where employers may use observable traits to make hiring decisions. Statistical discrim-
ination is not based on an inherent preference for hiring people of, say, a particular race
or gender, but instead on a real or perceived correlation between an observable trait and
unobservable productivity, or some unobservable aspect that informs the quality of a
hire.
We consider statistical discrimination as a self-fulfilling equilibrium phenomenon. The
model guiding our design is a stylized version of the model proposed by Arrow (1971)7:
a worker can decide to undertake a costly investment in productivity, and a firm has to
decide whether to hire the worker. The investment is only worthwhile to the worker if
she is hired by the firm, but the worker has to make the decision to invest or not before
knowing if she will be hired. The firm only wants to hire a worker if she has invested, but
has to decide on hiring the worker without knowing the worker’s choice. In our model,
summarized in Table 1, for small enough investment costs c, there are two pure-strategy
equilibria: (Invest, Hire) and (Not Invest, Not Hire). The former Pareto dominates the
latter; there is therefore the possibility for coordination failure, whereby workers fail to
invest because they correctly anticipate that they will not be hired.
Suppose there are two kinds of workers: GREEN workers and PURPLE workers—
these categories can stand for different genders, races, etc. If worker color is observable,
it is possible that firms will coordinate on (Invest, Hire) with, say, GREEN workers and
on (Not Invest, Not Hire) with PURPLE workers. This situation corresponds to what
7See Appendix F in Arrow’s paper; see also Coate and Loury (1993).
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we term statistical discrimination.
The particular flavor of statistical discrimination we are interested in, based on self-
fulfilling expectations about hiring and investment, begs the question of how a society
arrives at different hiring and investment rates for GREEN and PURPLE workers. The
answer in our paper is path dependence. Our experiment starts with a “seed” stage,
in which we make investment more costly for PURPLE workers. The seed stage may
then affect beliefs in later, symmetric, rounds of play. Firms and PURPLE workers may
coordinate on the Pareto dominated equilibrium because their beliefs are anchored in a
history in which the outcome was (Not Invest, Not Hire).
The difference in investment costs at the seed stage is certainly a simplification,
and is meant to capture a combination of possible real-world differences between people
of different genders, races, and ethnicities. One possibility is that it captures literal
differences in investment costs for members of disadvantaged and minority groups; for
example, differences in the cost of schooling. The difference in investment cost may
also reflect other difficulties in accessing the labor market, including those arising from
preference-based discrimination—historical hiring rates may have been lower for some
groups.
3.2 Overview of Treatments
For the purpose of describing the experiment, we define some standard terminology.
Our experiment consists of two players playing a simultaneous-move game. Each play
of the game is a round. Experimental participants play a number of rounds in one
roughly one-hour long sitting: each such sitting is a session. In a session, the same
group of participants plays the game repeatedly, each participant being randomly and
anonymously matched with other participants to play the two-player game. The different
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sessions vary in how we set the game parameters. A treatment is one specification of
game parameters.
Our experiment is comprised of three treatments, where each treatment is run in
several sessions. In all of our treatments, each session has four stages. Each stage
consists of a fixed number of rounds. At the beginning of the session, participants are
randomly assigned to the role of either a worker or a firm. Workers are also randomly
assigned a color: GREEN or PURPLE. Both a participant’s role and color, if applicable,
are fixed across all session rounds. This feature of our experiment is important and
should be emphasized: participants’ color is fixed throughout their participation in the
experiment, as is their role in the game.
Across treatments and stages, rounds follow a fixed protocol. In each round, workers
and firms are randomly matched in pairs to play an investment/hiring game, shown in
Table 1.8 Each worker decides whether to invest in costly training, where c represents the
cost of investment. Each firm, knowing the color of the worker she is paired with, decides
whether to hire the worker. Both worker and firm make their decisions simultaneously,
without observing each other’s decision. As we describe in the next subsection, the
firm’s profit from hiring a worker can depend on the stage, the worker’s color, and the
worker’s decision to invest or not. The determination of firms’ profits varies across our
three treatments. In each round, workers and firms are also asked to report their beliefs
about the other player’s decision. For instance, a worker is asked to report her belief
about how likely it is that the firm chose to hire her. Similarly, a firm is asked to report
her belief about how likely it is that the worker chose to invest in training. We use
the binarized scoring rule of Hossain and Okui (2013) to incentivize belief elicitation.
The binarized scoring rule is incentive compatible even for decision makers who are not
risk neutral. Before making their decisions, all participants can observe a public history
8All payoffs in the experiment are expressed in tokens, where 1 token = $0.01.
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consisting of four moving averages: (1) GREEN workers’ average investment rate, (2)
PURPLE workers’ average investment rate, (3) firms’ average hiring rate when paired
with a GREEN worker, and (4) firms’ average hiring rate when paired with a PURPLE
worker. These averages are based on the decisions of all participants across all previous
rounds of the session. For maximum clarity, these averages are reported graphically and
numerically. At the end of each round, participants observe both players’ decisions and
payoffs.9
At the end of the experiment, participants complete two risk elicitation tasks and
one survey questionnaire. Specifically, we use the risk elicitation task from Gneezy and
Potters (1997). Each participant is given a token endowment and decides how many
tokens to invest in a risky project with a known chance of success. We use duplicate
elicitations in order to account for measurement error, see Gillen, Snowberg, and Yariv
(2018). The survey questionnaire contains basic demographic, academic, and lifestyle
questions.10
3.3 Stages of the Experiment
We now describe the four stages of each session.
Stage 1: Seed Stage
In the first stage of each session (Rounds 1 - 10), GREEN and PURPLE workers face
different costs of investment. For a GREEN worker, the cost of investment is 200 tokens
(c = 200 in Table 1). For a PURPLE worker, the cost of investment is 600 tokens (c =
600). These parameters generate two different games depending on the particular worker-
9The full set of instructions is available here: http://www.leeatyariv.com/papers/
Discrimination_Instructions.pdf
10Survey details are available at: http://www.leeatyariv.com/papers/Discrimination_
Demographics.pdf
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firm matching. Notably, PURPLE workers have a dominant strategy of not investing.
When a firm is paired with a PURPLE worker, iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies yields (Not Invest, Not Hire) as the unique outcome; (Not Invest, Not Hire)
is therefore the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. When a firm is paired with a
GREEN worker, however, the strategic environment is a coordination game with two
pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (Invest, Hire) and (Not Invest, Not Hire). The (Invest,
Hire) equilibrium is Pareto-dominant. For each participant, playing their component of
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is a best response if the other participant is playing
their component of the equilibrium with a probability of at least 2
3
. Stage 1 serves to
“seed” discrimination between GREEN and PURPLE workers.
Stage 2: Baseline Stage
In the second stage of each session (Rounds 11 - 20), investment costs are equalized.
Both GREEN and PURPLE workers now face an investment cost of 200 tokens (c =
200). Statistical discrimination occurs if participants coordinate on the Pareto-dominant
(Invest, Hire) equilibrium when a firm plays against a GREEN worker, while participants
coordinate on the Pareto-dominated (Not Invest, Not Hire) equilibrium when a firm plays
against a PURPLE worker. The purpose of Stage 2 is twofold. The first is to test whether
statistical discrimination emerges in the lab, once “seeded” by Stage 1. The second is
to assess the extent to which it is alleviated over time, as the game with symmetric
investment cost is played repeatedly.
Stage 3: Introducing Affirmative Action
In the third stage of each session, we maintain equal investment costs for both colors, but
we implement an affirmative-action policy to incentivize the hiring of PURPLE workers.
The policy takes the form of a subsidy s for any firm that chooses to hire a PURPLE
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worker, regardless of whether or not the worker invested in training. Our experimental
treatments vary the size of the subsidy and the length of this stage.
• Subsidy: For a period of 10 rounds (Rounds 21 - 30), each firm that hires a
PURPLE worker earns an additional payment of 200 tokens (s = 200). For a firm,
hiring a PURPLE worker is now a best response if the worker is investing with a
probability of at least 1
2
.
• High Subsidy: For a period of 10 rounds (Rounds 21 - 30), each firm that hires a
PURPLE worker earns an additional payment of 900 tokens (s = 900). For a firm,
hiring a PURPLE worker is now a dominant strategy. Observe that by making the
hiring of PURPLE workers a dominant strategy, the High Subsidy treatment is the
mirror image of the seed stage.
• Long Subsidy: For a period of 20 rounds (Rounds 21 - 40), each firm that hires a
PURPLE worker earns an additional payment of 200 tokens (s = 200). For a firm,
hiring a PURPLE worker is now a best response if the worker is investing with a
probability of at least 1
2
.
Stage 4: Removing Affirmative Action
In the fourth stage of each session (Subsidy and High Subsidy: Rounds 31 - 40, Long
Subsidy: Rounds 41 - 50), the subsidy is removed. The parameters of Stage 4 are identical
to those of Stage 2.
3.4 Implementation
All experimental sessions were run at the Experimental Social Science Laboratory (ESSL)
at UC Irvine. A total of 268 participants participated in 15 sessions. A summary of the
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Subsidy High Subsidy Long Subsidy
Length of Experiment 40 rounds 40 rounds 50 rounds
Length of Stage 3 10 rounds 10 rounds 20 rounds
Subsidy for Hiring GREEN (Stage 3) s = 0 s = 0 s = 0
Beliefs for Hiring GREEN (Stage 3) pInvest ≥ 23 pInvest ≥ 23 pInvest ≥ 23
Subsidy for Hiring PURPLE (Stage 3) s = 200 s = 900 s = 200
Beliefs for Hiring PURPLE (Stage 3) pInvest ≥ 12 pInvest ≥ 0 pInvest ≥ 12
Number of Sessions 5 5 5
Number of Participants 88 84 96
Table 2: A summary of our experimental treatments.
treatments and corresponding sessions appears in Table 2. Each session lasted approx-
imately one hour. Each participant’s earnings were the sum of a $7 show-up payment,
their payoff from one randomly selected experimental round, and their payoff from one
randomly selected risk-elicitation task. Average participant earnings were $24.46 (in-
cluding the show-up payment). The experiment was programmed and conducted using
the oTree software (Chen, Schonger, and Wickens, 2016).
4 Experimental Outcomes
We describe our results using the entire set of data. In the Online Appendix, we replicate
the analysis using the last five rounds of each stage, in order to account for potential
learning effects. The analysis using the last five rounds yields identical conclusions.
4.1 Outcomes Across Stages
Inducing Statistical Discrimination (Stages 1 and 2)
Stages 1 and 2, in which we seed discriminatory beliefs and then assess the resulting
behavior, are shared across our treatments. We first present the data from these two
stages, pooled across all three treatments. Figure 2 shows investment and hiring rates
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(a) Investment (b) Hiring
Figure 2: Investment/hiring decisions before affirmative action
by worker color. The sharp differences in Stage 1, the seeding stage, in which investment
costs are unequal across worker types, are not surprising. Indeed, in this stage, PURPLE
workers have a dominant strategy of not investing. For Stage 2, the baseline stage, in
which investment costs are equalized across workers, 86% (576/670) of GREEN workers
and 61% (412/670) of PURPLE workers invest in training. Similarly, 87% (583/670) of
firms hire GREEN workers while 57% (380/670) of firms hire PURPLE workers. Both
differences are statistically significant at conventional levels (p < 0.001). These baseline
differences in hiring and investment rates for workers of different colors reflect statistical
discrimination.
We note that even when restricting attention to the very last round of the base-
line stage, Round 20, when participants have the most experience playing the invest-
ment/hiring game with equal worker costs, we find similar patterns.11 The discriminatory
outcomes we observe are persistent.
11Specifically, in Round 20, 82% (55/67) of GREEN workers invest in training, while only 52% (35/67)
of PURPLE workers invest in training. Similarly, 79% (53/67) of firms hire GREEN workers, while only
43% (29/67) of firms hire PURPLE workers. Both of these differences across worker types are statistically
significant at conventional levels (p < 0.001).
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3: Empirical CDFs of participant-level behavior before affirmative action
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We now look more closely at individual workers’ investment decisions. Combining the
data across the three treatments generates 134 individual-level observations pertaining
to workers per stage.12 In the seed stage, Stage 1, 60% (40/67) of PURPLE workers con-
sistently play their dominant strategy and do not invest in any round, while 66% (44/67)
of GREEN workers invest in all rounds. When the investment costs are equalized in the
baseline stage, Stage 2, only 27% (18/67) of PURPLE workers invest in all rounds while
75% (50/67) of GREEN workers invest in all rounds. The empirical cumulative distribu-
tion functions (CDFs) of participant-level investment rates are shown in Figure 3 (panels
a and b). In both stages, it is clear that the empirical distribution for GREEN workers
first-order stochastically dominates the empirical distribution for PURPLE workers.13
We conduct a similar exercise with respect to firms’ hiring decisions. Since firms
interact with both worker types in all stages, we calculate two different hiring rates for
each firm: their average hiring rate when paired with GREEN workers and their average
hiring rate when paired with PURPLE workers. The empirical CDFs of participant-level
hiring rates are also shown in Figure 3 (panels c and d). Consistent with our observations
pertaining to workers’ behavior, the empirical distribution for hiring GREEN workers
first-order stochastically dominates the empirical distribution for hiring PURPLE workers
in both stages.14
To summarize, individual analysis paints a similar picture to that produced by our
aggregate analysis above.
The results described so far utilize all sessions in our experiments, but the rest of the
paper uses a subset. When considering our data session-by-session, we see that in 3 of
12For each stage, an observation corresponds to a worker’s average investment rate across the ten
rounds of the stage.
13For each stage, we can also reject the null hypothesis that the average investment rates for GREEN
and PURPLE workers come from the same underlying theoretical distribution with a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test yielding p < 0.001.
14We can also reject the null hypothesis that the average hiring rates for GREEN and PURPLE
workers come from the same distribution with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test yielding p < 0.001.
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(a) Investment (b) Hiring
Figure 4: Investment/hiring decisions during affirmative action
our 15 experimental sessions, the differences in hiring rates across GREEN and PURPLE
workers in the baseline stage are not statistically significant at the 1% level.15 That is,
in 3 of our sessions, the mere equalization of investment costs across workers is sufficient
for generating equitable outcomes (or at least outcomes that are not statistically signif-
icantly unequal). Our study focuses on investigating the efficacy of affirmative-action
policies in reversing statistical discrimination: For this reason, when we turn to the anal-
ysis of affirmative action, we concentrate on sessions in which statistical discrimination
is induced. Thus, the analysis that follows concentrates on the 12 sessions in which sta-
tistical discrimination is observed and significant in the baseline stage. That said, we
emphasize that our qualitative conclusions do not change if we include all sessions in the
analysis—the Online Appendix reproduces our main results using all 15 sessions.
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Effects of Affirmative Action
Introducing Affirmative Action (Stage 3)
In Stage 3 of each experimental treatment, we introduce an affirmative-action policy in
which each firm who hires a PURPLE worker is paid an additional subsidy. The size of
the subsidy and its duration vary across our three treatments.
Figure 4 shows investment and hiring rates by worker color. Compared to the rates
in Figure 2, we see a decrease in discriminatory outcomes, but there are significant
differences between our three variants of affirmative action when it comes to workers’
investment behavior. A longer period of affirmative action, but not a larger subsidy, is
successful in reversing the investment patterns observed in the first two stages of the
experiment. Specifically, when the affirmative-action subsidy lasts for 20 rounds in the
Long Subsidy treatment, PURPLE workers invest at a higher, and significantly different,
rate than GREEN workers (p < 0.001). However, in both the Subsidy and High Subsidy
treatments, where affirmative action lasts only 10 rounds, GREEN workers invest at
higher and significantly different rates than PURPLE workers (Subsidy: p = 0.007, High
Subsidy: p < 0.001). In other words, PURPLE workers do not fully internalize firms’
responses to subsidies.
The three affirmative-action policies we test are effective in manipulating firms’ hiring
behavior. In the Subsidy treatment (10 rounds, s = 200), 73% (160/220) of firms hire
GREEN workers and 70% (153/220) of firms hire PURPLE workers. Furthermore, the
difference in average hiring rates of GREEN and PURPLE workers is no longer statisti-
cally significant (p = 0.463 with a two-sided t-test). Intensifying the affirmative-action
policy by increasing the size of the subsidy (from s = 200 to s = 900 in High Subsidy)
15Of the three sessions in which the hiring differences are not statistically significant, one session
belongs to the High Subsidy treatment and two sessions belong to the Long Subsidy treatment.
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Figure 5: Empirical CDFs of participant-level behavior during affirmative action
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increases hiring rates, without exhibiting discrimination of workers. Indeed, in the High
Subsidy treatment (10 rounds, s = 900), 83% (132/160) of firms hire GREEN workers
while 86% (138/160) of firms hire PURPLE workers.16 The difference in hiring rates
is, again, not statistically significant (p = 0.357). In the Long Subsidy treatment (20
rounds, s = 200), 90% (253/280) of firms hire GREEN workers, while 98% (273/280) of
firms hire PURPLE workers. In this case, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that
the average hiring rate is the same for GREEN and PURPLE workers (p < 0.001).
The individual-level data further confirm that affirmative action is largely successful
in reversing the previously-observed differences across worker colors. Figure 5 shows the
empirical CDFs of participant-level investment and hiring rates while affirmative action
is in place. For two treatments, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that GREEN and
PURPLE workers’ average investment rates come from the same distribution.17 Further-
more, for all treatments, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average hiring
rates of GREEN and PURPLE workers come from the same distribution.18
Removing Affirmative Action (Stage 4)
In Stage 4 of each treatment, we remove the affirmative-action subsidy. The parameters
of this stage are then identical to those of our baseline stage, Stage 2. The purpose of
this stage is to assess whether the benefits of affirmative action persist after the policy
is lifted.
Figure 6 depicts investment and hiring rates by worker color. In terms of both in-
16With s = 900, it is a dominant strategy for a firm to hire a PURPLE worker. We can reject the
null hypothesis that firms are consistently playing their dominant strategy (p < 0.001 with a one-sided
t-test).
17Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we have the following p-values across treatments. Subsidy: p =
0.203, High Subsidy: p = 0.011, and Long Subsidy: p = 0.863.
18Using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we have the following p-values across treatments. Subsidy: p =
0.814, High Subsidy: p = 1.000, and Long Subsidy: p = 0.976.
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(a) Investment (b) Hiring
Figure 6: Investment/hiring decisions after affirmative action
vestment and hiring decisions, we observe a surprising reversion to pre-affirmative action
patterns of behavior. In the Subsidy treatment, 80% (176/220) of GREEN workers and
48% (105/220) of PURPLE workers invest in training. After a larger affirmative-action
subsidy in the High Subsidy treatment, we find that 99% (158/160) of GREEN workers
and 50% (80/160) of PURPLE workers invest in training. Both of these differences in
average investment rates between GREEN and PURPLE workers are statistically signif-
icant (p < 0.001). When the duration of affirmative action is increased from 10 rounds
to 20 rounds in our Long Subsidy treatment, the reversion to previous discrimination
is weaker: 100% (140/140) of GREEN workers and 72% (101/140) of PURPLE workers
invest in training. However, we can still reject the null hypothesis that GREEN and
PURPLE workers invest in training at the same rate (p = 0.001).
Firms’ hiring decisions exhibit a similar pattern. In the Subsidy treatment, 72%
(158/220) of firms hire GREEN workers while only 42% (93/220) of firms hire PURPLE
workers. In the High Subsidy treatment, where the affirmative-action subsidy is substan-
tially higher, 93% (148/160) of firms hire GREEN workers while only 47% (75/160) of
firms hire PURPLE workers. Both of these differences in average hiring rates between
GREEN and PURPLE workers are statistically significant (p < 0.001). With a longer
period of affirmative action in the Long Subsidy treatment, we once again see that the
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deleterious effects of removing the subsidy are less severe: 94% (131/140) of firms hire
GREEN workers and 76% (106/140) of firms hire PURPLE workers. However, we can
still reject the null hypothesis that GREEN and PURPLE workers are hired at the same
rate (p < 0.001).
Figure 7 displays the empirical CDFs of participant-level behavior, both investment
and hiring, after the affirmative-action policy is lifted. In all cases, the empirical distri-
bution for GREEN workers either fully or nearly first-order stochastically dominates the
corresponding empirical distribution for PURPLE workers. This provides further evi-
dence that discrimination in favor of GREEN workers persists in our experimental labor
markets—even long after the explicit advantage of GREEN workers has been eliminated.
With regard to investment decisions, we can reject the null hypothesis that GREEN
and PURPLE workers’ average investment rates come from the same distribution in the
Subsidy and High Subsidy treatments, but not in the Long Subsidy treatment.19 With
regard to hiring decisions, we can also reject the null hypothesis that firms’ average hiring
rates for GREEN and PURPLE workers come from the same distribution in the Subsidy
and High Subsidy treatments.20 These observations further testify that a longer dura-
tion of affirmative action can mitigate the reversal of the policy gains when the policy is
eventually lifted.21
We note that there is a striking asymmetry between the effects of the seeding and
affirmative action stages. Seeding creates a long-lasting difference in how GREEN and
PURPLE workers behave, and how firms treat them. The affirmative-action policy is
similar in that it modifies the payoffs to the firms to undo statistical discrimination
19Specifically, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test we get the following p-values across treatments.
Subsidy: p = 0.006, High Subsidy: p = 0.003, and Long Subsidy: p = 0.055.
20Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test we get the following p-values across treatments. Subsidy: p =
0.001, High Subsidy: p < 0.001, and Long Subsidy: p = 0.944.
21While we focus on statistical discrimination alone, we suspect that the presence of preference-based
discrimination in environments such as ours would only exacerbate the outcomes we report.
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Figure 7: Empirical CDFs of participant-level behavior after affirmative action
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by favoring the hiring of PURPLE workers. However, this policy is nowhere close to
being as effective as the initial seeding. This observation is particularly interesting with
respect to our High Subsidy treatment, which effectively mirrors the seeding stage—it
lasts for an identical period of time and involves a dominant strategy for firms of hiring
PURPLE workers. Nonetheless, when the High Subsidy affirmative-action policy is lifted,
discriminatory outcomes reappear.
4.2 Choice from a Menu
In our experiments, each firm is randomly paired with a particular worker and faces a
binary hiring decision. In a labor market setting, however, firms are typically confronted
with the choice of which worker to hire from a menu of workers. The efficacy of an
affirmative-action policy would then be measured by its ability to nudge firms to hire
certain types of workers from a menu containing their favored workers. Our data allow
us to deduce expected choices from such menus of workers with and without affirmative-
action policies in place. That is, we can use our data to deduce how often firms would
hire a PURPLE worker when given the choice of hiring either type of worker.
In each round of the experiment, each firm is asked to report her belief about the
likelihood that the worker she is paired with chose to invest in training. Similarly, each
worker is asked to report her belief about the likelihood that the firm she is paired with
chose to hire her.22 Using these belief elicitations, we first calculate each firm’s average
reported beliefs for GREEN and PURPLE workers’ investment rates in each stage of
the experiment. Using these, we then calculate each firm’s expected payoffs from hiring
GREEN and PURPLE workers in each stage of the experiment. In the following section,
we show that firms best respond to their reported beliefs. We therefore assume that, when
22As mentioned earlier, we use the binarized scoring rule of Hossain and Okui (2013) to incentivize
belief elicitation. The binarized scoring rule is incentive-compatible even for decision-makers who are
not risk-neutral.
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Seed Stage Baseline Stage Introducing AA Removing AA
Subsidy 0.00 0.05 0.48 0.07
High Subsidy 0.06 0.03 1.00 0.03
Long Subsidy 0.07 0.11 0.93 0.25
Table 3: Fraction of firms hiring a PURPLE worker over a GREEN worker
faced with a menu, a firm would hire a PURPLE worker only if her expected payoff of
hiring a PURPLE worker is strictly greater than her expected payoff of hiring a GREEN
worker. Table 3 shows the fraction of firms hiring a PURPLE worker over a GREEN
worker under these assumptions (using the shorthand AA for affirmative action).
Consistent with our previous findings, we see that PURPLE workers would be hired
at a significantly higher rate when affirmative action is introduced (p < 0.001 in all three
treatments). However, when affirmative action is removed, the hiring rate for PURPLE
workers would decline substantially. Furthermore, in all three treatments, the hiring rate
for PURPLE workers after the policy intervention would not be significantly different
than prior to the policy intervention (p = 0.65 for Subsidy; p = 1.00 for High Subsidy;
p = 0.17 for Long Subsidy).
To conclude, by extrapolating our belief elicitation data, we derive predictions for
a richer market environment that echo our main findings. Statistically discriminated-
against workers, who compete against more initially “desirable” workers, benefit from
affirmative-action policies, but only while those policies are in place.
5 Beliefs as a Channel for Persistence
So far, we have focused on the binary outcomes of our experimental interactions (invest
or not for workers; hire or not for firms). We now investigate the evolution of partici-
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Seed Stage
Subsidy High Subsidy Long Subsidy
GREEN workers 0.85/0.84 0.74/0.89 0.79/0.89
PURPLE workers 0.93/0.93 0.87/0.87 0.94/0.94
Firms paired with GREEN 0.80/0.80 0.74/0.83 0.81/0.89
Firms paired with PURPLE 0.90/0.86 0.84/0.82 0.89/0.91
Baseline Stage
Subsidy High Subsidy Long Subsidy
GREEN workers 0.90/0.86 0.89/0.99 0.92/0.98
PURPLE workers 0.72/0.50 0.73/0.51 0.72/0.26
Firms paired with GREEN 0.88/0.89 0.86/0.96 0.91/0.99
Firms paired with PURPLE 0.69/0.48 0.74/0.47 0.69/0.34
Introducing Affirmative Action
Subsidy High Subsidy Long Subsidy
GREEN workers 0.93/0.76 0.88/0.93 0.82/0.92
PURPLE workers 0.81/0.35 0.85/0.36 0.97/0.09
Firms paired with GREEN 0.85/0.76 0.88/0.83 0.89/0.90
Firms paired with PURPLE 0.77/0.30 0.86/0.86 0.94/0.75
Removing Affirmative Action
Subsidy High Subsidy Long Subsidy
GREEN workers 0.87/0.79 0.89/0.99 0.96/1.00
PURPLE workers 0.85/0.52 0.91/0.63 0.86/0.68
Firms paired with GREEN 0.85/0.80 0.90/0.93 0.96/0.94
Firms paired with PURPLE 0.80/0.58 0.78/0.61 0.80/0.59
Table 4: Fraction of best-responses to reported beliefs/public histories
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pants’ beliefs throughout our experiments. As we will see, beliefs are rather sticky, and
while agents respond to the pecuniary incentives subsidies introduce, their beliefs are not
altered dramatically.
We first inspect the linkages between beliefs and actions in our experiments. We
consider the question of whether participants are playing best-response strategies, both
with respect to their reported beliefs and with respect to the public history of play.
Table 4 shows the breakdown of best-response rates by participant role/color, treatment,
and stage. As can be seen, participants’ actions are largely optimal given their reported
beliefs. In aggregate, 85% (7,534/8,880) of participants’ actions are a best response to
their reported beliefs.23 Participants best respond to the public history at far lower rates,
standing at 73% (6,483/8,880). This is reasonable—since the public history includes
the results from all previous rounds and does not reset between stages, less sensitivity
to the public history implies sensitivity to the changing parameters/incentives of the
experiment.
While participants’ actions are consistent with their beliefs, actions are far coarser.
The evolution of beliefs throughout our sessions can provide more insight into the action
choices we observe. Figure 8 illustrates workers’ average beliefs across rounds and Figure 9
illustrates firms’ average beliefs across rounds, along with the average public history that
was visible to participants on the experimental interface.
Reported beliefs roughly reflect trends of the public history, but differ in magnitudes
and slopes. They are slightly less optimistic for GREEN workers and substantially more
optimistic for PURPLE workers. In particular, participants do not simply mimic the
public history when reporting beliefs.
23This is consistent, if somewhat higher, than other reported statistics of best responses, see e.g.
Rey-Biel (2009) and references therein.
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Figure 8: Workers’ beliefs and firm hiring history (solid black lines illustrate threshold
beliefs for investment to be optimal)
31
Figure 9: Firms’ beliefs and worker investment history (solid black lines illustrate thresh-
old beliefs for hiring to be optimal)
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Importantly, while we see a jump in beliefs pertaining to PURPLE workers’ invest-
ment after the seeding stage, beliefs remain fairly flat afterwards, with only slight in-
creases during the affirmative-action phase, which flattens out during the affirmative-
action phase of our Long Subsidy treatment. The level of beliefs is such that, absent
subsidies, the decision to hire is only marginally optimal in some cases, whereas it is
clearly optimal when affirmative-action incentives are in place.24
In contrast, beliefs regarding GREEN workers are slightly below those suggested by
their actual investment rates. Naturally, one needs to take with care any impression that
beliefs are pessimistic. Indeed, experimental investment rates by GREEN workers are
rather high. Therefore, any natural experimental perturbations of those statistical rates
that generate beliefs would generally shift average assessments down. Regardless, beliefs
are sufficiently high as to guarantee hiring throughout the different experimental stages.
In order to quantify these effects as well as summarize the results of the paper, we
estimate the following OLS regressions separately for each treatment:
Beliefit = β
B
0 + β
B
1 ∗ IntroducingAAt + βB2 ∗RemovingAAt + εit
and
Hireit = β
H
0 + β
H
1 ∗ IntroducingAAt + βH2 ∗RemovingAAt + εit,
where Beliefit is firm i’s reported belief (from 0 to 1) about the likelihood that her paired
PURPLE worker in round t chooses to invest in training, Hireit is a dummy variable
24One might wonder whether participants are simply coordinating on the mixed-strategy equilibrium
of the game in the baseline and final stages, which would be consistent with the reported beliefs. We
note that, at the individual level, behavior in these stages is inconsistent with that equilibrium (see
Figure 6).
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that equals 1 if firm i hires a PURPLE worker in round t, IntroducingAAt is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if round t is in Stage 3 of the experiment (when affirmative action
is introduced), and RemovingAAt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if round t is in
Stage 4 of the experiment (when affirmative action is removed). Last, εit is an error
term, which we cluster by participant.
Since we are interested in the impact of affirmative action and its removal, we restrict
our analysis to firms interacting with PURPLE workers in Stages 2 - 4 of the experiment.25
The regression results are shown in Tables 5 and 6. The first three columns correspond to
our three treatments. The fourth treatment splits the first 10 and last 10 periods of the
affirmative-action stage in the Long Subsidy treatment. The corresponding regression
allows us to infer whether the length of the subsidy is internalized by participants early
on. Indeed, absent forward-looking behavior, the first 10 periods of the affirmative-action
stage in that treatment are equivalent to the full affirmative-action stage in our Subsidy
treatment.
Echoing our previous observations, affirmative action is effective in manipulating both
firms’ beliefs and hiring decisions while the policy is in place. For each treatment, the
coefficient estimates βˆH1 and βˆ
B
1 are positive and statistically significant. For a given
treatment, we can then compare the magnitudes of βˆH1 and βˆ
B
1 to capture the relative
effectiveness of the affirmative-action policy in manipulating firms’ actions and beliefs.
Across all treatments, we see that βˆH1 > βˆ
B
1 . That is, firms’ beliefs are less responsive to
the policy intervention than firms’ hiring decisions.
The coefficient estimates βˆB2 and βˆ
H
2 then measure the extent to which the benefits
of affirmative action persist even after the policy is lifted. In each treatment, we find no
statistically significant difference in the hiring of PURPLE workers between the affirma-
25As before, we only include the sessions in which we generated statistical discrimination in our baseline
stage, Stage 2, of the experiment.
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Subsidy High Subsidy Long Subsidy Long Subsidy
VARIABLE: Hire (1) (2) (3) (4)
Introducing AA 0.173** 0.331*** 0.311***
(0.066) (0.062) (0.065)
Removing AA -0.100 -0.063 0.093 0.093
(0.074) (0.060) (0.079) (0.079)
Introducing AA (first half) 0.307***
(0.064)
Introducing AA (second half) 0.314***
(0.067)
Constant 0.523*** 0.531*** 0.664*** 0.664***
(0.059) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066)
Observations 660 480 560 560
Number of participants 44 32 28 28
Table 5: Results from OLS regressions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
are clustered at the individual level. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
tive action stage and after affirmative action is lifted. However, βˆH2 > 0 only for the Long
Subsidy treatment, albeit insignificantly so. In a similar vein, looking at firms’ beliefs
about PURPLE workers, the coefficient estimate βˆB2 is positive and, here, statistically
significant only for the Long Subsidy treatment.
We note that the effect of affirmative action is significantly stronger in the first 10
periods of our Long Subsidy treatment than in the phase of 10 analogous periods in our
Subsidy treatment. This suggests that participants account for the length of affirmative-
action policies even when they are first introduced. This implies that placing a longer-
duration affirmative-action policy has two advantages. A longer duration increases the
effectiveness of the policy even in its early introductory phase, in addition to enhancing
its long-run effects after its removal. Going back to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 2003
quote, it is possible that a sufficiently long phase of affirmative action, which may or may
not correspond to 25 years, would assure some erosion of discriminatory attitudes both
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Subsidy High Subsidy Long Subsidy Long Subsidy
VARIABLE: Firm Belief (1) (2) (3) (4)
Introducing AA 0.086** 0.085** 0.218***
(0.041) (0.036) (0.037)
Removing AA 0.022 -0.019 0.172*** 0.172***
(0.055) (0.037) (0.043) (0.043)
Introducing AA (first half) 0.193***
(0.035)
Introducing AA (second half) 0.244***
(0.042)
Constant 0.490*** 0.512*** 0.655*** 0.655***
(0.044) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
Observations 660 480 560 560
Number of participants 44 32 28 28
Table 6: Results from OLS regressions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
are clustered at the individual level. Significance levels are indicated as follows: ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
during and after affirmative action is in place.
In our experiments, participants also respond to two risk elicitations as well as var-
ious demographic questions. Importantly, when adding these as controls, neither has a
significant effect nor do they alter the coefficients of treatment effects described above.26
The Online Appendix contains a detailed description of this analysis. In the Online Ap-
pendix, we also consider the possibility that firms that are more highly discriminatory
in the baseline stage respond differently to affirmative action and its removal. We clas-
sify firms into types pertaining to their discriminatory tendencies in the baseline stage
and illustrate that, indeed, effects are more pronounced for firms that are initially more
discriminatory.
26One exception is inclusion in a minority group, which significantly reduces hiring when affirmative
action is introduced and when it is lifted in our High Subsidy treatment. However, since this is the only
significant effect out of our five controls in the three treatments, we suspect it might be spurious.
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6 Discussion and Conclusion
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy first utilized the term affirmative action in its
contemporary sense in Executive Order 10925. The intention was to have government
contractors “take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and employ-
ees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national
origin.” Today, affirmative action refers to the leading set of laws, policies, guidelines,
and administrative practices aimed at alleviating racial and gender-based discrimina-
tion. Our goal in this paper is to use an array of lab experiments to assess the effects
of affirmative-action policies in combatting statistical discrimination, while in place and
after they are lifted.
Our results raise questions about the long-term effectiveness of affirmative-action
policies. To level the playing field, our findings suggest that affirmative-action policies
need to be activated for substantial periods of time. These implications relate to the
empirical regularity that affirmative-action policies tend to become entrenched, and left
in place far longer than initially intended, see Sowell (2004).
Any conclusion about the long-term effects of affirmative action should be qualified.
We have focused on affirmative action as an instrument for correcting statistical dis-
crimination in labor markets, but there are other sources of discrimination, and other
environments in which discrimination occurs. For instance, it is quite possible that
exposing people to the rich diversity of humankind may change their beliefs through
various channels—role models, exemplars, etc.—and thereby address taste-based dis-
crimination.27 There is also a fairness argument in favor of affirmative action—it serves
as compensation for past discrimination. Affirmative action in education does not only
seek to change expectations, its objective includes granting access to minority students
27For instance, Miller (2017) illustrates some positive effects of temporary affirmative-action policies
that he explains through employers improving their hiring practices.
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who would not otherwise be able to attend good schools or to obtain higher education
(see the landmark study of Bowen and Bok (2016) for an elaborate discussion of affir-
mative action in education). There are also possible dynamic benefits from affirmative
action. Even if affirmative action does not eliminate discrimination today, it may help
future generations of minorities access better opportunities. As in our experiments, the
fruits of affirmative action might simply take a long time to ripen.
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